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Strategy, Contracts and Control in Government IT Work 
 





This chapter develops and applies an heuristic framework to analyse the structure of 
contractual forms of organising and the ways that these condition work. The framework 
is informed by sociological, economic, institutional and labour process theories about 
work. From a sociological perspective, social structures are understood in terms of the 
balance of power existing between different social groups. Jessop (1996) outlines a 
‘strategic-relational’ approach, in which the location of groups affects the strategies that 
they may adopt in pursuit of sectional interests. From this perspective the reproduction of 
social processes is affected by the ‘structural constraints’ operating within specific 
localities. For the purposes of this chapter institutional, labour process and economic 
theories are used to inform our understanding of the structural constraints that affect the 
strategies groups may pursue (also see Hyman, 1986; Ackroyd, 2002). This is not to deny 
the reflexivity of the agents involved, or that they can and do transform their social 
structures through their actions, but that action is contingent on location. Archer (1995) 
draws a useful distinction between ‘corporate’ agents and ‘primary’ agents. The former 
group find themselves in a structural location where they are able to pursue collective 
interests and the latter, whilst an identifiable group, are relatively powerless. To a greater 
extent all those involved in productive organisations are corporate agents (Ackroyd, 
2002), whether managers, employees, shareholders or governmental policy makers. 
 
This orientation to analysis is used to approach a ten-year contract, signed in the mid 
1990s by FutureTech1. FutureTech is one of a handful of computing specialists that 
oligopolise the market for managing large IT contracts. The contract was for the delivery 
of IT services to Govco, a government department that outsourced its Information 
Technology Office (ITO). FutureTech, a US based multinational, had expanded rapidly 
over the previous decade by taking over computer work from large firms and government 
departments. This particular contract specified a 50% reduction in the unit cost for IT 
systems development over the first five years, which was achieved and hailed as a 
success. However, this evidence identifies significant problems with both the 
accountability of managerial employees at the centre of the governance structure and in 
the employment policies and practices adopted before and after the signing of the 
contract. There was evidence of poorly performing new IT systems, increased tightness 
in the control of IT workers at various levels and a question mark over the organisation’s 
ability to reproduce its skill base. This chapter argues that these problems were, in large 
part, attributable to the way that contracts were drawn-up and regulated. 
                                                 
1 As far as possible the names of organisations, job titles and personnel have been made 
anonymous.   
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The chapter is divided into several sections. Firstly, we delve further into economic, 
institutional and labour process theories to consider the particular, capitalist structures 
that affect the agencies involved in contractual forms of organising, as well as the nature 
of government contracting. The second section goes on to explore the case study itself. 
The contractual arrangements between Govco and Futuretech are compared to earlier in-
house IT operations and consideration is given to the way that this contract was managed 
and the forces that influenced managers’ choices. The chapter also considers the effect 
that outsourcing had on the organisation’s ability to produce and reproduce knowledge. 
 
Inter-organisational governance and the control of work: 
 
From the perspective of transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1975, 1985) the more 
complex and uncertain the thing to be contracted for, and IT services are highly complex 
and uncertain, the less the purchaser can control the outcome. Exact contractual 
specification is impossible. This means that the purchaser can be vulnerable to 
opportunistic behaviour, as managers may be tempted to cut costs and make profits at the 
expense of quality in the service delivered. It is prudent, therefore, to contract for goods 
and services where outcomes can be easily specified in advance, typically low skilled and 
peripheral work. Opportunistic behaviour is likely to stop short of compromising the 
viability of the other organisation in the relationship, as this will not be to its economic 
advantage (Krepps, 1990; Dore, 1996). It is possible for non-optimal and monopsonistic 
economic structures to exist, provided that dominant actors are happy for events to 
continue. Also, whilst there may be the potential for opportunistic behaviour on one side 
of a relationship, it cannot be assumed that such behaviour will occur. The purchaser may 
either regulate the supplier, at extra cost, or trust that the supplier is acting in their 
interests.  
 
In this regard, institutional theorists lead us to consider the forms of regulation and trust 
that exist where any transaction is embedded. Sako (1992) distinguishes between arms-
length contractual relations (ACR), such as that associated with low skilled outsourcing, 
and obligational relational contracting (OCR), where inter-organisational managers share 
information to co-ordinate the delivery of more complex services. She suggests that 
Britain’s relatively weak regulatory context pushes relations towards the ACR type as 
there are few structures encouraging co-operative forms of inter-firm behaviour. 
Likewise, Lane and Bachmann (1997) compare the institutional context of Germany and 
Britain and suggest that strong forms of regulation through, inter-alia, trade associations, 
vocational training policies and industrial relations procedures encourage ‘systems trust’ 
and more co-operative forms of behaviour in Germany as outcomes are more predictable. 
This is the central conundrum of contracting in the UK, that while it may be more 
‘economic’ to contract for certain goods and services, it is also more difficult for the most 
efficient outcome to be achieved. Trust cannot be assumed and needs to be developed 
through local management relations between organisations (Bachmann, 1999). 
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However, the problem is context specific as in the UK where strong regulations exist, 
such as the chemicals industry, OCR type relationships are more likely to be effective 
(Marchington and Vincent, 2001). The question is whether or not the forms of regulation 
that exist in government contracting are appropriate for the development of long term, 
trusting inter-organisational relations of the OCR type. 
 
The rise of 'government by contract' (Camaghan & Bracewell-Milnes, 1993) or the 
'contract state' (Kirkpatrick & Martinez Lucio, 1996) has altered public services 
provision so that many are delivered through contractual relations rather than hierarchical 
authority structures (Deakin & Walsh, 1996). This shift was originally inspired by the 
neo-liberal ideology of the Conservative government (1979-1997) that saw markets as 
the most effective distributors of goods and services. The logic being that, since different 
markets will enjoy different advantages it should be possible (given appropriately 
specified contracts) to harness these for the benefit of the public. The Labour 
administration that has been in place since 1997 has done little to switch emphasis.  
Under the Conservatives various interventions, including the Local Government Act 
(1988) and the 'Competing for Quality' White Paper ensured that many activities 
previously undertaken by the public sector were transferred to private sector firms. 
Labour interventions, such as Private Finance Initiatives, have sought to secure private 
sector investment in public infrastructure; effectively transferring the responsibility for 
short-term costs which are often politically sensitive. This process has transferred many 
‘peripheral services’ to private sector contractors (see Grimshaw et al, 2002) and 
continues, despite research questioning the cost effectiveness of government contracts 
(Boyne, 1998).  It may be that political expediency, coupled with blind faith in the 
efficiency of market provision (Gamble, 1994) are rather more influential in decisions to 
outsource infrastructure developments and services than policymakers would like us to 
believe.  
 
Most government outsourcing is of low skilled work (Boyne, 1998; Rainbird and Munro, 
2003). In these contracts, outsourcing often makes cost savings through the deterioration 
of staff terms and condition, as in McIntosh and Broderick’s (1996) account of refuse 
collectors. Attempts to mitigate this through TUPE have had a limited effect (Cooke et al. 
2000). More generally, the fact that many savings are the result of deteriorating terms and 
conditions rather than private sector ‘expertise’ is a cause for concern.  
 
While unskilled work may be measured in terms of cost, the legitimation for outsourcing 
skilled work is more nuanced with calls for a shift from hierarchical structures to ‘quasi’ 
market control mechanisms (Bartlett and LeGrand, 1993; Bartlett, et al, 1994; Challis, et 
al, 1994). Some suggest that it is possible to create a new hybrid sector, incorporating the 
public values of quality service and accountability with private sector efficiencies 
(Brereton and Temple, 1999). However, mixed forms may erode the public service ethos 
(Corby and White, 1999); lack transparency and accountability, particularly where 
difficulties in verifying 'quality' are apparent (Grimshaw, et al, 2001); and may introduce 
rigidity in the form of contractual (mis)specifications and repetitions double counting, 
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due to the increased need to demonstrate efficiency (Grimshaw et al, 2002; Grugulis et al, 
2003).  
 
As suggested in the introduction, a focus on the employment relationships of those that 
work in and control these organisational forms would seem a useful starting-point for an 
analysis of outcomes.  Transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1975, 1985; Krepps, 
1990) and more institutional perspectives (Sako, 1992; Bachmann, 1999) suggest that 
behaviour is contingent on the nature of the economic context within which it is situated. 
For example, for Williamson the comparatively most efficient or transaction cost 
minimising form of behaviour will always prevail. Institutionalists, on the other hand, 
study the ways that specific social and political contexts shape behaviour towards 
predictable outcomes. Both may be accused of neglecting the capacity for agency (see 
Ackroyd, 2002). 
 
Social scientists from a range of traditions including managerial strategists (Boxall, 1996; 
Boxall and Purcell, 2000), labour process (Braverman, 1974; Thompson and Smith 2001; 
Thompson and McHugh, 2002) and critical social theorists (Friedman, 1977; Edwards, 
1979; Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999) tend to concentrate on how the control of work is 
driven by managers and employees acting and reacting to specific organisational 
contexts. In these accounts agency and management actions cannot be simply ‘read off’ 
from either organisational structure or market conditions. Managers make policy choices 
as to how best to deploy the resources available to them and as these choices may conflict 
with the wishes of other groups, organisations are political and contested arenas. 
 
Here, the way that organisations control employees is central to understanding 
organisational choices and strategies. Friedman (1977) captures these tensions in his 
distinction between direct control, in which work is strictly prescribed by managers, and 
responsible autonomy, in which the employee is afforded control within a given 
jurisdiction. For Friedman, peripheral groups tend to be controlled directly and treated on 
the basis of their skills. Here, ‘centre-periphery’ relationships, (such as outsourcing), are 
not unproblematic but arise ‘out of struggle, out of a combination of differential workers 
and managerial strategies’ (pp.116-117, own emphasis). 
 
These tensions apply equally to inter-organisational arrangements.  Most accounts of 
collaboration focus on relative forms of advantage.  Given, for example, the competition 
for key knowledge workers that occurs in particular sectors, even well funded 
organisations may not be able to afford to finance expensive specialist employees 
indefinitely. Particularly since Boxall and Steeneveld’s (1999) study of engineering 
consultancies suggests that a critical mass of personnel, or ‘table stakes’, is required to 
function as an effective organisational unit.  Organisations that cannot (or do not wish to) 
meet these table stakes may think that the potential costs and rigidities of transacting in 
the (external) product market outweigh the costs and rigidities of transacting in the 
(internal) labour market. 
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In order to analyse the governance of inter-organisational relations and employment 
outcomes it may be helpful to combine the notions of direct control and responsible 
autonomy with ACR/OCR (see figure 1).  Here, contractual specifications and the control 
of work provide four categories: output control, procedural control, normative control 
and technical control (see also Lepak and Snell, 1999). Such a device is, inevitably, a 
simplification.  In reality, jobs may have autonomy in some areas but be subjected to 
control in others, and different groups of workers may have their work controlled 
differently under the same contract. Likewise, obligational and transactional elements can 
co-exist (Sawyer and Walker, 1992; Rubery et al, 2003).  However, this framework may 
provide a useful starting point for a strategic-relational analysis into the effect of different 
contractual structures on employment relationship outcomes. 
 
Figure 1: Contractual Relations and Employee Control 
 
• Long term, 
relationship based 
contract
• Employees work 
dictated by managerial 
specifications 
(Technical Control)
• Long term, 
relationship based 
contract
• Employees working 
towards mutual aims 
autonomously 
(Normative Control)
• Tightly specified 
contract
• Employees tightly 
controlled in 
completing the 
contract      
(Procedural Control)
• Tightly specified 
contract
• Employees relatively 
autonomous in 
achieving contractual 




Responsible Autonomy Direct Control
 
 
Introducing the case study: IT work at Govco 
 
The research presented here is taken from a wider project on Changing Organisational 
Forms and Organisational Performance, funded by the ESRC as part of their Future of 
Work programme.  Work was conducted into eight case study companies between 1999 
and 2002.  One case study, ‘FutureTech’, is taken from the wider project and explored in 
detail here. In total, 14 interviews were conducted with senior managers involved with 
contract management in FutureTech and Govco (the department that outsourced its IT 
provision) as well as 33 with line managers and programmers in FutureTech. The data 
was collected over two years, and was combined with access to a large collection of 
government reports, internal documents and observations of the way that specific 
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contracts for computing services operated. In addition, employees were also asked to 
describe and reflect on their work histories and experiences, providing an elementary 
longitudinal profile. 
 
Previously all IT work had been undertaken in-house and the ITO, which employed over 
2250 staff, had an annual budget of £250 million and considered itself to be in the 
vanguard of governmental IT systems development. However, the task of servicing 30 
Govco divisions, which often competed for resources when few outside the ITO 
possessed expertise in computing, was fraught.  One senior manager Colin, who still 
worked in IT management for Govco, explained that: 
 
Users with the most vague idea about what they wanted would come along to the 
[ITO] and we’d sit down with them, and we wouldn’t charge for the service, and 
we would understand what their objectives were, and we would take that to 
programming, and we would test it for them, and we would roll it out and hold 
their hands for the first few months. So, they didn’t really understand what was 
involved in developing the product 
 
The lack of specialist knowledge outside the ITO was reflected in the lack of control 
structures imposed on it. There was no comprehensive audit of systems and capabilities. 
Nor was the overall performance of the ITO systematically measured. Control of 
resources was left to local project managers and technical experts who used their own 
judgement as to the relative price and effectiveness of the technologies available. As 
David, one FutureTech senior technical expert said: 
 
in the old ITO it was almost a techies bunch. Managing direct relationships with 
vendors was “Okay, what’s the latest hot stuff? We’ll have some of that, oh don’t 
worry about that”, and the business was done. There was a certain interplay of 
value for money there. I mean, people weren’t stupid 
 
Strategy was driven by the technologies available and local knowledge about how they 
might be applied. This kept the control of IT development in the hands of the ITO, 
leading to widespread resentment from other divisional managers and accusations of poor 
accountability, with many projects not held to timescale or budget. According to two 
independent consultants’ reports the ITO was 25% less efficient than equivalent private 
sector organisations and could operate with up to 880 fewer staff. Such claims should be 
treated with caution, as the development of unique IT systems is notoriously difficult to 
price. Despite years of negotiations Govco and FutureTech could not agree on a valid 
reference point for benchmarking the performance and relative value of the work done. 
However, when they were issued, these reports were highly influential and, coupled with 
the ‘Competing for Quality’ White Paper, it was these that persuaded Govco to outsource 
its IT services. Following a tendering process, the contract was awarded to FutureTech 
and a new contractual discipline brought in to control the work of managers. 
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The new organisational structure was intended to be both more transparent and more 
accountable and, to a certain extent, it succeeded. In order to manage the new inter-firm 
relationship, as well as the 1700 staff who had transferred across from Govco, an 
elaborate ‘partnership’ arrangement was devised. The structure included around 200 
managers from the Govco side, organised within its Business Operations Division, and an 
equivalent number of managers from Futuretech, organised within a newly formed Govco 
Contract Division. The Govco side of the partnership was answerable to the Govco 
board, and other governmental institutions, such as the National Audit Office, which 
regularly reviewed the accounts. The FutureTech side was accountable to Govco and the 
Board of FutureTech and the respective heads of each organisation met every year to 
discuss the performance of the contract. As part of the transfer, FutureTech was also 
required to recognise a trade union for bargaining purposes.  This was agreed, but 
FutureTech management did not extend bargaining privileges to employees hired after 
the initial transfer and the union could claim little involvement with the day-to-day 
running of the contract: 
 
You are not obliged to talk to the unions about your business plan. They used to 
put it on the agenda and I used to refuse to talk about it. He couldn’t understand 
why. I told him in private that I wasn’t prepared to talk about strategic direction 
of the business, to be blunt, in front of people who were only interested in tea 
breaks and goodness knows what. (Frank, Senior Manager: FutureTech) 
 
In practice, the senior managers, who liased between FutureTech and Govco, enjoyed a 
great deal of influence in ensuring the success of the relationship. A contractual 
specification was needed for each piece of work and the managers at the centre of the 
‘partnership’ were responsible for coordinating, defining, pricing and monitoring these. 
Contracts were priced on the basis of a complex system of the number of ‘function 
points’ (an industry standard measurement of computer code) that needed to be 
developed. This was then used by FutureTech to assess the ‘man hours’ (their term) 
required to do a particular job. In practice specifications often had a considerable amount 
of latitude; timescales were almost always set, but the exact requirements for completing 
a contract might not be known in advance. Nor were all function points equal in terms of 
cost and this was acknowledged and allowed for in the system. When FutureTech 
delivered function points cheaply they were expected, retrospectively, to accept a lower 
price. When scarce skills were required, these had to be purchased separately at a price 
that reflected their ‘market’ value.  
 
Many of the contractual mechanisms that existed to assist the smooth running of the 
‘partnership’ acknowledged the fallibility of the function point system and were 
designed, not to improve the system, but to make efficiency improvements mutually 
beneficial. These included: open access to FutureTech accounts, a practice rare in 
outsourcing which also made it possible to negotiate prices after contracts had started; a 
profit sharing arrangement, should FutureTech make more than a given amount in any 
financial year resources would be given back to the Business Services Division (typically 
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to be invested in research); and financial disincentives to failure, such as reduced bonus 
payments for FutureTech in the event of an overspend and increased financial costs for 
Govco when contracts were poorly specified.  Liaison took the form of a hierarchy of 
meetings between the two organisations, with problems that could not be resolved locally 
referred up the line.  Contracts that were likely to fail were to be referred to the most 
senior management, although this was said to be rare.  Since contractual specifications 
needed to be both flexible and precise and since prices could be negotiated 
retrospectively negotiations were often complex with both sides engaged in ‘horse 
trading’. 
 
One of the main strengths of the ‘partnership’ was not the system of governance but the 
similarities between the senior management from both organisations and their shared 
interest in making the project a success. Both sides were dominated by middle aged, 
white men, all driven by the same set of efficiency related goals. Colin also said with 
pride:  
 
I pull [FutureTech] into meetings with me to other customers and they cannot tell 
the difference. They can’t say “well you’re the [FutureTech] bloke and you’re the 
[Govco] bloke”. We talk the same language, we say the same things, we are 
motivated by the same goals, we both want to be successful 
 
Both sides stood to benefit from profit sharing. When this occurred, the Govco Account 
Division could show the FutureTech board that they had achieved a reasonable profit and 
the Business Services Division could show the Govco board that they were delivering 
results.  Such a ‘partnership’ structure may drive the demonstration of competence and 
efficiency over and above that which is really present (see also Grimshaw et al, 2001). 
The scope provided in contractual specifications could, as one senior industry respondent 
conceded, lead to both sides colluding in order to demonstrate shared achievements. 
 
With a few notable exceptions, such as the Internet technologies, the vast majority of 
contracts have been delivered within timescale and budget, and a profit share has been 
returned to the Business Services Division on every year of the contract. These 
achievements were presented as marks of success, suggesting that the partnership has 
more successfully controlled both the work of the programmers and the deployment of 
resources.  But it is also possible that generous specifications made contracts easier to 
deliver and much of the 50% increase in efficiency may be attributable to more general 
advancements in the ‘tools’ used to do the job, technologically it is possible to do more 
with less. One FutureTech manager described the organisation’s ‘core competence’ as 
‘the ability to predict the future price of developing computer code’. 
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Contractual Structures and Employment Relationships 
 
Outsourcing had significant implications for the way that programmers’ work was 
controlled.  As noted above, when work was undertaken internally programmers had a 
considerable amount of autonomy.  Once the department had been contracted out the 
programmers became subject to ‘scopes of work’, which specified the times allocated to 
projects.  Managers too were more constrained, in the sense that their careers depended to 
a greater extent on their ability to demonstrated that money being spent had been 
accounted for. David said: 
 
I think that what happened when [FutureTech] took over we became more 
technically constrained because we had to start taking notice of the fact that this 
cost money, therefore we had to justify it. We became more commercially 
competent but we didn’t become more technologically aware because in the past 
we ran our own evaluations without interference. When [FutureTech] came on 
board there was another angle of evaluation to be taken. It almost seemed as 
though another echelon of management activities had to be gone through to 
manage those types of evaluation and relationship things (Technical Manager: 
FutureTech) 
 
Despite these changes in governance, there were broad continuities in working practices 
that were conditioned by the relationship between the IT systems and the organisation. IT 
systems were, and remain, central to Govco’s organisational performance and its cost 
reduction strategy. Govco’s work is to administrate high volumes of unique and 
interrelated transactions. A task that is complicated by regular government policy 
changes that had to be catered for when designing IT systems. This means that the IT 
systems are highly complex, idiosyncratic and interconnected. When new functions are 
developed, they must be integrated to existing systems (that are often written in different 
computer languages) to ensure that the system works as a whole. This requires the 
combination of a variety of different types of knowledge: knowledge of new 
technologies; knowledge of existing IT systems (so that new technologies could be 
adapted to them); specific knowledge of the wider Govco operation and its relationship 
with central government; and, knowledge of the administrative structure of IT delivery. 
Work was organised on a project or programme basis with large pieces of development 
often running simultaneously, so that existing systems were maintained and enhanced 
and new IT functions developed. Some consistency in practices was retained after the 
transfer of undertakings as the project management structure of the work was dictated by 
a predictable bi-annual flow of government policy changes.  
 
Under the ITO programmers had been in a comparatively favourable position.  Terms 
and conditions were subject to collective bargaining and there was a complex status-
based pay grading arrangement related to both hierarchical position and length of service, 
with additional increments awarded individually on the basis of performance appraisal. 
There was also a flexi-time arrangement and overtime pay.  Within the ITO these 
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arrangements were complicated by recruitment difficulties and the labour market power 
IT workers could exercise.  In practice this meant that promotion was rapid since it was 
the only means of raising pay, a practice resented by managers elsewhere in the 
organisation. 
 
The ITO tended to recruit internally when they could. This ensured that employees 
already had a great deal of local knowledge of Govco practices and systems before being 
trained in the technology. Despite this, there were significant skill shortages and these 
were compounded by financial austerities, which included a general embargo on 
recruitment. Since contractors were not classed as ‘employees’ in the accounts the 
cutbacks resulted in increasing numbers of costly consultancy workers, occasionally in 
preference to updating employees’ skills and promoting them (see also Harvey and 
Kanwal, 2000).  Some workers, with highly specialised skills, were purchased for short 
periods to develop new technologies. Others were ex-Govco employees who had 
resigned to sell their work back to Govco at a higher price. The cost of contracted labour 
was reported as four times the price of equivalent internal supply. Unsurprisingly perhaps 
some contractors, who bragged about their pay, were described as having poor people 
management skills and a ‘cavalier attitude’. Outsourcing the ITO was first considered in 
1991, after expenditure on contractors quadrupled from around £2 million to over £8 
million during the 1980s. 
 
After the transfer, FutureTech was able to end the relationships with these consultancy 
workers, either by offering them permanent employment contracts or waiting for the 
existing agreements to expire. While this ended the relative financial autonomy and 
freedom from local constraints that these workers enjoyed, it may have alleviated some 
of the ITO’s problems. As Geoff, one transferred manager said: 
 
People liked being managed by [FutureTech] people, [they] tended to be more 
professional … everyone was treated with respect for the work they did. 
 
However, the removal of contractors did not signal a more general stabilising of 
employment relationships. There were changes in personnel with most new staff having 
individualised employment contracts; inter-organisational contracts were used to drive 
projects and performance-monitoring practices were introduced. These had significant 
implications for the way that the programmers experienced work. While the ITO had had 
few hard measures of performance, in the new organisational structure over 400 measures 
of contractual efficiency were used to guide decision-making. 
 
Under FutureTech each request for work required a business case and an analysis of the 
resources that would be needed. Contractual specifications were written and awarded, 
after discussions with programmers and technical experts and these acted as planning 
tools, allowing resources to be allocated over a pre-set timescale. The degree to which 
individuals felt constrained by this structure varied depending upon the type of skills they 
had, the employment contract that they held with FutureTech and the type of contract for 
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services they worked on. For a minority of the skilled IT developers and managers there 
were opportunities on other FutureTech contracts to obtain promotion and develop new 
skills. In theory, these transfers could benefit Govco since it would no longer have to pay 
the costs associated with retraining or terminating an employment contract when an 
individual’s services were no longer required. In reality Govco managers argued that 
much of their best talent was transferred from Govco work, leaving their business to be 
run by a ‘B-team’. FutureTech management, however, maintained that Govco only 
purchased the work to be done, not the specific people who did it and would only accept 
Govco intervention in the event of a failure to deliver work to contract. Given the 
position of FutureTech and flexibility in the contracts awarded Govco intervention was 
unlikely in all but extreme cases, although there were examples of managers on failing 
projects being ‘moved sideways’ after a ‘quiet word’ from senior managers. As a result 
of Govco’s concerns an assessment of skill needs was undertaken. This identified 
significant skill gaps, particularly in the area of Internet technologies, which FutureTech 
was taking steps to remedy. In some areas FutureTech itself started to hire external 
contractors.  
 
The transfer was also designed to make cost savings through a voluntary redundancy 
programme, financed by Govco, in which some 200 personnel (of the 800 that applied) 
left the organisation. Yet over the first five years of the contract the amount of work to be 
completed doubled and several hundred university graduates were recruited. A smaller 
number of people were hired from the wider labour market, typically at more senior 
levels. The graduates were cheaper than the workers they replaced, but, while many had 
technical skills, none enjoyed the in-depth knowledge of Govco’s existing systems and 
work practices, and their role was variously and insultingly described as: ‘warm bodies’, 
‘bums on seats’ and ‘cheap labour’. Supervisors, also working to meet contractual 
deadlines, rarely had the time to develop their subordinates in a systematic way. 
Employees also thought that the removal of experienced personnel meant that the 
remainder had to work harder. Peter, one graduate employed as a supervisor, said: 
 
The redundancy programme and stuff … certainly reduced the amount of, not just 
business but the technical knowledge as well because a lot of them they have a 
mass of business knowledge, but also a technical experience as well and it’s 
certainly limiting the amount we’ve got at the moment ... I think it might just 
mean you need to work a little harder the time you’re here, I think.  But 
essentially yes, it may be that you have to work a bit longer ...  It’s such a 
challenge though when they lose these people what they do to replace them, 
because it’s almost impossible (Graduate: FutureTech) 
 
According to one ex-Govco programmer, the internal systems were so complex that, after 
working on one of Govco’s larger system for two years ‘you can only scratch the surface 
of being useful to the team because of the business knowledge’. 
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The new graduates were both much younger than their ex-Govco colleagues (because of 
the freeze on recruitment) and employed under very different terms and conditions. Over 
1500 ex-Govco personnel worked for FutureTech in administrating, managing and doing 
programming work, with a handful, who had considerable technical knowledge, acting as 
internal consultants. All ex-Govco staff had their terms and conditions protected by 
TUPE and, although they could transfer onto a ‘Standard’ FutureTech contract, none of 
the staff questioned said that they had done so. Their working time arrangements were 
protected and the union continued to conduct collective bargaining. There was little that 
FutureTech managers could do to compel this group to stay late to meet a deadline, and, 
when they did overtime they could claim this back through flexitime arrangement or get 
extra pay.  
 
Despite these benefits, transferred staff in the lower grades suspected that they were 
underpaid. As Alex, one programmer argued: 
 
There are three of us on the team who’ve got the same sort of money and we are 
all in the lowest quartile of the range. There are people on the team who, within 
the next two or three years, will pass my salary. They’ve been here for four years 
and can do the code as good as I can. They might be quicker than I am. They are 
more conversant with PCs if they are younger, but they haven’t got the business 
knowledge to realise the impact of changing the system. And that does cause a bit 
of resentment, but if I was driven purely financially then I could probably go to 
my boss and say I want to go on the standard package … but I don’t want to do 
that … I’m married with kids. I’m 46 years old so I’m well down the line. There’s 
always the chance that when I reach 50 I might be able to get out by early 
retirement and we’ve got a fairly good early retirement that they do offer. 
 
In marked contrast to the ex-Govco employees, no graduate interviewed was over thirty. 
They were recruited directly from universities and typically occupied more junior jobs in 
programming and contract management. Two, were interviewed in supervisory roles and 
three others, with scarce technical skills, had already reached higher status technical roles 
in the new on-line services group, but graduates were not found at senior levels 
elsewhere in the structure.  
 
All of these new hires had the ‘Standard’ package, with individualised terms and 
conditions and annual pay and performance reviews. None were paid overtime. For those 
on the Standard package promotion and taking on more responsibilities did not lead 
directly to increases in pay. Pay was determined by annual performance reviews. In these 
career and pay recommendations were linked to a systems of peer group and supervisory 
performance appraisals. Raises could also be on an ad hoc basis for effort above the 
norm.  In addition to this there was a series of ‘morale boosting’ minor rewards, 
generally given to those who worked through the weekend to solve a problem or meet a 
deadline.  This could be anything from lunch at McDonald’s to ‘a night out with the 
girlfriend or boyfriend’. Ultimately the team leaders made recommendations for bonuses 
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and pay and the local managers decided whether or not to award these. Many of those 
interviewed complained that the bonuses offered by FutureTech for completing contracts 
did not match their expectations but the lack of skills development (with its implications 
for career trajectories) was a more serious source of grievance. In some cases graduates 
were asked to do repetitive tasks for long periods. Managers confessed that careers were 
often constrained by the demands of the contract.  According to two employees: 
 
I talked to other Standard package people who work on projects, they work so 
many extra hours a week consistently and they don’t get paid for that  … You’re 
paid this much a year to finish a job and although they don’t use those words 
that’s the way it is. (Rob, graduate programmer) 
 
At the end of the day it boils down to what business needs dictate so at the end of 
the day whatever you want comes second place to what [FutureTech] want, which 
is perhaps fair enough because they pay your wages. (Peter, graduate supervisor) 
 
It seems that, while the new structure succeeded in introducing a mechanism for 
controlling the work that the IT programmers undertook it was less effective at 
reproducing and developing the skills necessary for these tasks.  New recruits were no 
longer subject to civil service grading structures and could enjoy higher salaries, but 
pressures of work often limited their opportunities to develop skills and those who were 
career minded considered moving away from the Govco contract.  For Govco, 
FutureTech could provide a repository of expertise but its other work meant that skilled 
staff might be transferred to other posts, new hires had little of the local knowledge that 
was necessary and some work was still undertaken by contractors.  
 
Synthesising Accounts: governance, employment and technology development 
 
Programmers who were employed adapting existing IT systems were very tightly 
controlled.  Here, since managers on both sides had a considerable amount of local 
knowledge, contracts could be very tightly specified and, since most effort was put into 
delivery, the success rate was almost 100%.  The same could not be said of the 
development of new systems.  FutureTech was given the task of introducing Internet 
technologies, as part of a government commitment to providing on-line services.  
Interestingly, despite its expertise in other areas of computing, FutureTech had little 
experience of the Internet.  It did however employ so many ex-Govco IT staff, that it 
would have been extremely difficult to develop and incorporate any new IT systems 
without large amounts of work going to FutureTech. Govco was effectively ‘locked in’ to 
development work with FutureTech for the duration of the contract. Furthermore, it is 
likely, given the knowledge of Govco systems that FutureTech managers held, that they 
would continue to depend on FutureTech expertise after the existing contract expired 
(also see Grimshaw et al, 2002).  
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Graduates, who were more likely to have developed the required technical skills at 
university (though some were retrained after recruitment), dominated the on-line services 
group.  As in other areas, hiring graduates was less expensive than retraining existing or 
ex-Govco staff.  Various FutureTech and ex-Govco managers were deployed to the group 
to advise on developing the systems.  Here though, the nature of the task not only gave 
employees more autonomy, it also meant that there was less scope for generous 
contractual specifications.  FutureTech failed to meet its deadlines and Govco purchased 
‘off the shelf’ packages from a third party.  David, a FutureTech technical expert, said 
 
I couldn’t say I’m proud of the quality of the stuff that we’ve done because the 
engineering discipline wasn’t in the teams. However, if you talk to the customer 
[about the project] quality, they don’t care about quality … so they are happy to 
accept functional degradation, they are happy to accept performance degradation. 
We don’t deliver all the functionality, it doesn’t run as fast as you might like. 
 
Failure had implications for the managers involved: 
 
The natural consequence of it all is that you tend to think of what are the 
implications of everything you do. If this is scrutinised and it all goes wrong, 
which it may do because there are risks associated with everything, what would 
happen? And you tend to get, particularly in the user community and in 
[FutureTech] to some degree, is a risk aversion driven, not by risk analysis as a 
business would do it but in terms of what would be the effect of someone blaming 
me for this thing if it goes wrong. (Roger, senior business development manager: 
FutureTech) 
 
FutureTech management preferred to implement proven IT solutions rather than ‘risky’ 
new technologies. And, given tight government budgeting, FutureTech could and did 
repackage technologies deployed elsewhere, whether or not these were suitable, because 
they were cheap and easy to implement: 
 
[FutureTech] puts its own slant on the partnership, its technology set-up, its pacts 
of technology, and basically, tries to leverage those to the customer’s advantage, 
but sometimes it might not work to the best of the customer’s advantage. (David, 
senior technical expert: FutureTech) 
 
Given the age structure of the workforce the pool of ex-Govco personnel is likely to 
shrink dramatically in the medium-term. Under the new organisational structure, specific 
knowledge of Govco is more difficult to reproduce. The alignment of internal recruitment 
and business knowledge that existed under the ITO is gone. It may be that future changes 
to the service will be dictated by what FutureTech can provide, rather than the 
uncertainties of a broadly specified and obligational contract. And, given the centrality of 
IT to Govco’s wider business objectives, the technological tail may well start wagging 
the governmental dog. 
 14
 
Discussion and Conclusions: 
 
This case study provides a dramatic illustration of the way that agency impacts on social 
structures. The partnership with FutureTech was intended to provide private sector 
business practices and a repository of computing expertise for Govco.  FutureTech’s 
resources would enable it to cope with rapidly changing technologies and skill 
requirements and the agreement between the two organisations would ensure that 
technological innovations did not result in profiteering. In practice, Govco was so 
concerned at the possibility of failure that success was a political expediency. This might 
have been expected. Management is a political, rather than a neutral process, and 
managerial actions will be influenced by expectations of performance (Jackall, 1988).  
Indeed, a key element of sociological and labour process writings is the impact of control 
systems on outcomes (see, for example, Braverman, 1974; Thompson and McHugh, 
2002). Actors ‘reflect[ing] on their identities and interests, are able to learn from their 
experiences and, by acting in contexts that involve strategically selective constraints and 
opportunities, can and do transform social structures’ (Jessop, 1996, p.125). 
 
Managers were charged both to reduce costs by 50% and to define and complete the 
contractual schedule by which this would be achieved. This in turn provided a set of rules 
through which managers’ acted to demonstrate their control over work.  In the case study 
managers were observed removing expensive skills from the organisation to reduce costs 
despite an increase in workload, yet contracts were still almost inevitably completed to 
schedule. Ultimately, the managers were accountable to government auditors, not other 
IT experts who might judge the standards that they set themselves. The contractual 
process that managers used to demonstrate their control of the costs affected how 
expertise was produced and reproduced. Within the new organisational form employees 
often had reduced career prospects and individualised terms and conditions encouraged 
un-rewarded increases in the effort bargain. 
 
This reading of the evidence has direct implications for the way that (particularly 
externally sourced) work is controlled and the types of work that might be suitable for 
out-sourcing.  In the ‘partnership’ there was an uneasy tension between the need to 
tightly specify the work (that existed amongst managers due to the financial controls in 
place) and the fact that new work could not be controlled through direct contractual 
structures. This, in turn, created a requirement for managers to negotiate the outcomes. 
As a result of this contractual auditing, the discretion individual workers and managers 
could exercise sharply reduced (Grugulis et al, 2003) with negative consequences for the 
learning potential of the organisation over the long-term. 
 
Much of the existing evidence suggests contractual governance structures are not the best 
way to manage complex IT developments. For example, Willcocks et al. (1995) case 
study evidence suggest that problems are likely where, as at Govco, organisational 
strategy and performance is highly contingent on effective IT systems. Also, Lacity and 
 15
Hirschman (1993) suggest that IT contractors almost invariably perform relatively poorly 
as corners are cut and information withheld in order to secure greater profits. It would 
seem that ‘opportunism’ is endemic within this field. This evidence suggests that 
‘opportunism’ is conditioned by the strategies and identities of those involved in 
organisational practices. These are in turn influenced by the structure of markets and 
institutions that constrain and enable strategic choices. As Hyman notes, ‘changes in the 
external environment of corporate activity which in one sense narrow the range of 
strategic options may compel internal restructuring which facilitates strategy within the 
area of choice which remains’ (1987, p.49).  
 
In the case of the Govco-FutureTech ‘partnership’ managers may be accused of behaving 
opportunistically to demonstrate their successes. The accountancy and ‘partnership’ 
structure provided a tool to (re)shape the labour process of IT workers, and managers 
used this tool to control the work of programmers more directly. However, it is 
questionable whether or not the managers of the ‘partnership’ were truly accountable for 
the standards that they set themselves. It appeared that the ‘partnership’ set its own 
standards and the accountancy structure created a risk adverse climate within which 
innovation was stifled by the desire to demonstrate successes. Ackroyd (2002) suggests 
that the emergence of inter-organisational relations in contemporary Britain is associated 
with decline in the corporate agency of other stakeholders relative to that of managers. 
This evidence suggests, in the absence of significant countervailing forces that challenge 
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